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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we compare two high-profile strategic policy reviews undertaken 
for the UK government on environmental risks: radioactive waste management 
and climate change. These reviews took very different forms, both in terms of 
analytic approach and deliberation strategy. The Stern Review on the Economics 
of Climate Change was largely an exercise in expert modelling, building, within 
a cost-benefit framework, an argument for immediate reductions in carbon 
emissions. The Committee on Radioactive Waste Management, on the other 
hand, followed a much more explicitly deliberative and participative process, 
using Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis to bring together scientific evidence and 
stakeholder and public values. In this paper we ask why the two reviews were 
different, and whether the differences are justified. We conclude that the 
differences were mainly due to political context, rather than the underpinning 
science, and as a consequence that, while in our view “fit for purpose”, they 
would both have been stronger had they been less different. Stern’s grappling 
with ethical issues could have been strengthened by a greater degree of public 
and stakeholder engagement, and CoRWM’s handling of issues of uncertainty 
could have been strengthened by the explicitly probabilistic framework of Stern. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In late July 2006, the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (generally 
known as “CoRWM”), which was set up by the UK government in 2003, 
published its recommendations in Managing our Radioactive Waste Safely (1, in chapter 
9). CoRWM endorsed geological disposal as “the best available approach” in 
principle for the long-term management of the UK’s radioactive waste “within 
the present state of knowledge”. Just three months later, Sir Nicholas (now Lord) 
Stern presented his UK government-sponsored review of climate-change policy, 
The Economics of Climate Change (2). He recommended “prompt and strong action” 
worldwide to deal with climate change. Both of these were high-profile exercises 
in the strategic appraisal of environmental risks and yet they took strikingly 
different approaches. In this paper we ask why, and whether the differences are 
justified. Our overarching motivation for this paper is the improvement of 
decision making in the face of such environmental risks, particularly in relation 
to the use of formal methods such as Cost Benefit or Decision Analysis. 
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These strategic policy reviews are of interest as they provide a window on how 
government can approach the analysis of substantive environmental risks. 
Contrasting them, as we do in this paper, brings out the particular choices which 
government makes in framing, and which the reviewer or review team has in 
undertaking, such reviews. In this analysis we draw on documentary evidence, 
in particular the reports themselves, but also personal experience, as both the 
authors were involved in one or other of the reviews. The first author was a full-
time member of the Stern Review team in the UK Treasury, and the second 
author was a member of the team of consultants that facilitated CoRWM’s Multi-
Criteria Decision Analysis. Despite our personal involvement, we do 
nevertheless take a gently critical view, arguing that both of these reviews could 
profitably have drawn on some of the tools of the other. 
 
Both climate-change policy and radioactive waste management centrally involve 
risk and irreversibility, in each case playing out over very long timeframes. In the 
case of radioactive waste, the key decision is one of whether to emplace the 
waste in a permanent geological disposal facility or leave it in temporary storage. 
The argument for the former is that we can have sufficient confidence in the 
performance of a suitably designed and located facility to contain the waste, and 
in any case, no better solution is likely to become available in the foreseeable 
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future; the argument for the latter is that this confidence is overstated, and we 
risk losing the flexibility to respond when new information arises. In the case of 
climate change, the key decision on emissions reductions is whether to take 
aggressive action now or postpone intervention to the future. The argument for 
taking action now is that anthropogenic climate change is irreversible, and we 
already have enough evidence that it is real, and at least potentially catastrophic. 
The counterargument is that investments to reduce emissions are also costly to 
reverse, that we are currently too uncertain about the benefits of such emissions 
reductions, and that we should wait until we have learned more about them.  
 
How best to approach policy problems involving decision under risk has been a 
source of contention for decades. In this paper we draw on the view articulated 
by Stern and Fineberg (3) that the process for handling such problems should 
generally be at least to a certain extent an “analytic-deliberative” one (for clarity, 
we note that the Stern of Stern and Fineberg is not the Stern of the Stern Review). 
Drawing implicitly on the thought of Habermas, Stern and Fineberg present 
analysis and deliberation as distinct modes of approaching problems: 
 
We use the term analysis to refer to ways of building understanding by 
systematically applying specific theories and methods that have been 
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developed within communities of expertise, such as those of the 
natural science, social science, engineering, decision science, logic, 
mathematics, and law [disciplines] (p 97). 
 
Deliberation is any formal or informal process for communication and 
for raising and collectively considering issues. In deliberation, people 
confer, ponder, exchange views, consider evidence, reflect on matters 
of mutual interest, and attempt to persuade each other (p73).  
 
Stern and Fineberg argue that these modes are mutually strengthening and that 
organisations concerned with risk-related decisions should acknowledge the 
relevance of analysis and deliberation and give conscious attention to how they 
are integrated. Stern and Fineberg also acknowledge that analysis and 
deliberation are often closely intertwined in existing practice (for example, 
academic peer review is a form of deliberation deployed within scientific 
disciplines): nevertheless, their synthesis provides a basis for good practice, and 
we see this current paper as amplifying their main themes in the context of the 
strategic policy review. 
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There were striking differences between CoRWM and Stern both in the nature of 
the analytic techniques used (Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis versus a range of 
economic and probabilistic approaches to support Cost-Benefit Analysis), and 
also in the form which deliberation took (broad- versus narrow-based). We ask 
three central questions: 
a) How did the reviews’ approaches differ? 
b) What explanations can be given for why the reviews differed? 
c) Should the reviews have been less different, and what could they learn from 
each other? 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. To address question a), we outline the 
differences between the two reviews in Section 2. In Section 3, turning to 
question b), we note the choices of analytic approach and deliberative strategy 
were linked, and explore possible reasons for these differences, in terms of (i) the 
underpinning science, (ii) the scale of the problem and (iii) the political context of the 
reviews. The structure of these two sections is summarised in Figure 1. In Section 
4, we give our answer to the difficult question c), and then in Section 5 we 
conclude. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
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2. HOW DID THE REVIEWS’ APPROACHES DIFFER? 
 
On one level, CoRWM and Stern appear to have considerable similarities. Both 
were commissioned at the highest levels of government to report on a knotty 
problem. In both cases, the political sensitivity of the issue and its technical 
complexity generated a perceived need to commission senior figures with 
credible independence from the heart of government to lead the review. Both 
were similar in scope with budgets of a few million pounds sterling and lead-
times to delivery of about two and a half and one and a half years respectively. 
Nevertheless, there were substantial differences (table I). In this section we focus 
on the differences in terms of analytic approach and deliberation strategy. 
 
Table I about here 
 
2.1. Analytic approach 
 
Both reviews drew on substantial bodies of scientific evidence, although the 
relevant scientific communities were obviously different: CoRWM had relatively 
little need to consult atmospheric scientists, just as Stern had for hydrogeologists. 
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Similarly neither review was a research project in the underlying science – both 
broadly accepted the consensus view. Both drew on analytic approaches for 
integrating the scientific information, relating it to value-relevant outcomes, and 
ultimately trading-off conflicting desiderata. However, the approaches drawn on 
to do this were quite different – Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) in the 
case of CoRWM and Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) in the case of Stern. 
 
CoRWM’s approach, while technically innovative in various ways, and 
unusually ambitious in scale, is recognisable as an MCDA of a type familiar in 
the context of environmental appraisal (e.g.4, 5-7). Roughly, CoRWM’s MCDA 
worked as follows. A long list of solutions was prepared, some of which were 
eliminated at an early stage to obtain a shortlist. At workshops attended 
predominantly by scientists and other experts, short-listed options were scored 
on a number of different criteria. These criteria were then weighted to arrive at 
overall value scores using a “swing weighting” elicitation procedure (8). 
 
Criteria weights were elicited from the public and stakeholders with standard 
aims of public and stakeholder consultation in mind – namely democratic 
legitimacy, substantive insight into the decision problem, and in the hope of 
smoothing over public opposition (9). Criteria weighting was chosen as the 
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vehicle for doing so, in order that public and stakeholder views would be 
operationally useful and focussed on the key trade-offs at hand. The Committee 
members themselves deliberated over criteria weighting in a series of workshops 
or ‘Decision Conferences’ (10-12). Extensive sensitivity analysis was done to explore 
whether the recommended solutions were robust to reasonable changes in 
weights, on the basis of information garnered from the public and stakeholder 
engagement. CoRWM also made a holistic assessment of the solution options to 
tap into the Committee members’ overall, disaggregate feel for how the options 
performed. For further details the reader is referred to Chapters 10 and 11 of 
CoRWM’s report and Morton, Airoldi and Phillips (9). 
 
In Stern’s case, the review team followed the standard logic of CBA, comparing 
costs and benefits with the welfare-economic motivation of only recommending 
policies that increase some proxy of aggregate well-being (e.g. 13). This 
conventionally involves measuring costs and benefits in money units wherever 
possible. The nature of this exercise places heavy emphasis on expert modelling, 
and distinguishes it from many MCDAs in the environmental domain in the UK, 
where the emphasis is on structuring the analysis around stakeholder 
engagement (7, 14). Thus Stern built an argument for immediate and strong 
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cutbacks in carbon emissions on the basis of a wide range of technical modelling 
exercises to quantify costs and benefits. 
 
In some academic circles, the extent to which Stern’s analysis can be considered 
an example of CBA has been debated (15-19). This appears to stem from the fact that 
Stern did not use a single so-called ‘integrated assessment model’ (see 20) to 
estimate the monetary costs and benefits of emissions reductions. Rather it made 
partial use of a variety of models, on the grounds that no single model could be 
considered adequate for all purposes (21). This precluded formal estimation of the 
‘optimal’ target for global carbon emissions in welfare-economic terms, which 
would have been a natural task to undertake if a single model had been used (e.g. in 
22, 23, 24). Another reason why Stern’s analysis deviates from the sort of formal 
model-building exercise one might find in an academic paper is uncertainty. At 
times Stern built his case on evidence that was not modelled at all (see especially chapter 3 
of 2). This predominantly concerned the estimation of the benefits of emissions 
reductions (the avoided impacts of climate change), where some of the identified 
risks were so poorly understood that they had not been incorporated in the 
relevant models. Nevertheless, the basic logic was to compare costs and benefits 
and to recommend policies that provided net benefits on aggregate (see chapter 
13 of the Review). Indeed, in comparison with previous appraisals of emissions 
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targets in the UK (25, 26), the Stern Review included explicit monetisation of the 
benefits of emissions reductions for the first time (chapter 6). More generally, 
CBA as practised by government rarely, if ever, resembles the sort of purely 
formal analysis that some commentators had in mind when debating the status 
of the Stern Review.1 
  
As mentioned, a particular feature of Stern was its emphasis on analysis of, and 
attitudes to, uncertainty. Stern’s main point, that immediate and strong 
reductions in carbon emissions are warranted, was based on reductions in the 
probability of particular temperature changes ‘bought’ by progressively tighter 
climate targets. These probabilities were derived from complex climate-
modelling exercises (e.g. 27). Similarly, the Review’s attempt to estimate the benefits 
of emissions reductions in money units (chapter six) was based on a substantial 
Monte Carlo simulation procedure, as was its principal attempt to estimate costs 
(28`, in chapter 9). 
 
2.2. Deliberation strategy 
 
                                                 
1 We are grateful to Michael Spackman for this point. 
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We regard both CoRWM and Stern as having a strong deliberative aspect. 
However, they differ both in terms of the internal composition and dynamics of the 
review team and the extent to which they availed themselves of broader 
mechanisms of public and stakeholder engagement.  
 
We deal first with internal composition and dynamics. CoRWM was set up as an 
independent committee outside the Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (DEFRA), the central-government department with responsibility 
for radioactive waste management policy, and the team had a diverse 
membership, both by discipline (including economics, law, politics, and relevant 
science and engineering disciplines) and by profession (including academics, a 
lawyer, a lay member and a prominent environmentalist). This contrasts with a 
traditional advisory committee, with highly focussed and directly relevant 
expertise. Members of CoRWM were senior and in some sense equal in rank; 
most had several decades of relevant experience. While some members had spent 
a large portion of their working lives in the nuclear industry, others were 
opponents of UK policy, both on radioactive waste management and nuclear 
matters more generally. By contrast, the Stern Review was undertaken ‘in-house’ 
by a team of civil servants either directly in the employ of the Treasury or on 
secondment from other central-government departments with a policy interest 
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(e.g. DEFRA, the Department for International Development, and the then 
Department of Trade and Industry). The review team sat within the Treasury 
and contributions from independent experts such as academics were invited 
either on an informal, advisory basis or on a consultancy basis. While by all 
accounts the Review was produced by a team, it contrasts with CoRWM in being 
deliberately structured around a significant public figure.  
 
In addition to its status and composition, the two processes differed in terms of 
the use they made of formal public and stakeholder engagement mechanisms. 
External parties were extensively involved in CoRWM’s formulation of the 
problem and in various stages of CoRWM´s decision process from long-listing to 
option assessment, as well as commenting on the recommendations. Indeed, both 
CoRWM’s members and outsiders such as its Independent Evaluator regarded 
its public and stakeholder engagement as ground-breaking in the UK (29). Central 
to its engagement were three separate fora for ongoing dialogue with external 
interests: a National Stakeholder Forum of various interest groups, which met 
four times over the course of the review; eight Nuclear Site Stakeholder Round 
Tables comprising stakeholders from nuclear communities, which met three 
times; and four Citizen’s Juries (30, 31), which each met three times. CoRWM took 
particular care to feed its deliberations back to these various fora, so that while 
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there was a recognition that not everyone would agree with the Committee’s 
emerging view, there was no doubt that all expressed opinions had been 
considered. This intensive engagement exercise was complemented by a broader 
exercise in disseminating information and soliciting views, including the 
circulation of a discussion guide to many hundreds of stakeholder groups across 
the UK.  
 
The Stern Review on the other hand did not bring external parties into the 
process so formally and so intensively. A call for evidence was opened in early 
October 2005 and was closed by mid January 2006. Shortly afterwards, at the 
Oxford Institute of Economic Policy (‘Oxonia’) Distinguished Lecture in Oxford 
on 31st January 2006, Stern tested out his initial views (32). Many of the ultimate 
findings of the Review were presaged here. Further responses to the Oxonia 
lecture were invited until March. Both prior and subsequent to the Oxonia event, 
Stern and his team also engaged in an extensive programme of consultation with 
academics, policy-makers and non-governmental actors, both at home and across 
many of the countries seen to be important in international climate negotiations, 
such as Brazil, China, India and the United States. Yet these were typically one-
off and informal, either in the nature of fact-finding or of dissemination of 
emerging conclusions. While views were diligently and extensively sought, there 
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was no formal provision for the consultees to monitor whether and to what 
extent their views were impacting on decisions, which is the defining 
characteristic of the ‘consultation’ mode of public and stakeholder engagement, 
as famously set out by Arnstein (33) in her ‘ladder of citizen participation’. There 
was little if any engagement with lay members of the general public; these 
myriad consultations tended to be restricted to academic and policy networks. 
This is not to deny that the Stern Review process was deliberative. Rather, the 
point we seek to make is that Stern’s public and stakeholder engagement was 
informal and inward looking (towards established nodes of influence in 
domestic and international climate policy), while CoRWM’s was formal and 
outward looking. 
 
3. WHY DID THE REVIEWS DIFFER? 
 
While there were real and stark differences between the two reviews, we would 
caution the reader against interpreting them as polar opposites. The CoRWM 
members, for example, were very aware that their role was not simply to reflect 
back public opinion, but to take responsibility for recommending to government, 
and the substantial amount of intellectual work which CoRWM put in, 
assembling and cross-checking facts and weighting judgement and argument, is 
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evident in their final report, just as was the case for Stern. And just as CoRWM 
was at pains to point out that the MCDA – as the decision-analytic literature 
consistently stresses – was a tool to support decision making, not an attempt to 
automate it, Stern also rejected the identity that might be constructed between 
policy analysis and formal modelling, in the conviction that the application of 
economic tools to policy must be done with careful attention to underlying (and 
often implicit) assumptions and value judgements embedded in these tools.  
 
Nevertheless, as we have emphasised above, CoRWM and Stern, despite their 
similarities, differed substantially in terms of both their choice of analytic 
method, as well as their deliberation strategy. To some extent, these choices were 
linked: insofar as Stern is an economic review, it is also technical, requiring 
familiarity with economic theory and methods; CoRWM’s diverse team, on the 
other hand, produced a report which has no specific disciplinary allegiance. 
CBA, although it draws on public values through surveys and market studies, is 
not an instrument for consultation, while MCDA has been promoted by 
opponents of CBA as a form of analysis which is more inherently democratic, 
participative, and multiperspectival (e.g. 34, 35) (while on the other hand proponents 
of CBA sometimes present MCDA as supine or vacuous, doing nothing more 
than reflecting back to decision makers their own beliefs).  
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We now turn to discussing explanations for the observed differences. In doing 
so, we follow recent contributions to the literature on risk regulation (e.g. 36) and on 
policy appraisal (e.g. 37), which attempt to dig beneath the surface of apparently 
overarching trends in regulation (e.g. 38, 39) to describe and explain why in fact the 
style and stringency of regulation often varies from one risk to another. What 
such contributions have fruitfully asked is whether differences in the nature of 
regulation, including different methods of gathering information such as, in our 
case, different approaches to strategic appraisal, are due to differences in the type 
of risk or differences in the political context, such as public opinion and pressure 
from interest groups. Here we consider two aspects of the type of risk to be 
regulated – (i) the nature of the underpinning science of climate change compared 
with radioactive waste and (ii) the scale of the problem – before going on to 
consider (iii) the political context.  
 
3.1. Underpinning science 
 
In both cases there are considerable similarities in the role of the underpinning 
science. For both climate change and radioactive waste, scientists feel that much 
of the basic underlying science is well-understood (the role of greenhouse gases 
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has been understood since Tyndall; North (40) remarks that “there is nothing 
unusually mysterious to the trained scientist about nuclear energy, ionizing 
radiation or radioactive isotopes”). This does not, however, preclude uncertainty 
about the performance of particular systems, for example the climate system, or 
the behaviour of radioactive waste under the unusual conditions it will 
encounter in a geological repository, or its movement and impacts in the 
biosphere. In both cases, such evidence as there is concerning system behaviour 
comes from the distant past: in the case of radioactive waste the Oklo deposit in 
Gabon where a naturally occurring nuclear reactor left deposits of radioactive 
nuclides in a geological setting; in the case of climate change, much relevant 
evidence comes from palaeoclimatological studies of climate fluctuations. The 
fact that these events are so long in the past contributes to uncertainty, but in 
both cases the uncertainty is compounded by the need to extrapolate to 
situations which do not precisely correspond to any previously experienced. 
Although radioactive wastes will potentially remain hazardous for tens or 
hundreds of thousands of years, this profoundly long timescale is not a feature 
unique to radioactive waste; many of the consequences associated with climate 
change such as sea-level rise are also not just long-lasting, but effectively 
irreversible; consequences may be felt not merely for millennia, but forever.  
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As there appear to be no sharp differences between the role of science per se, and 
as both reviews were scientifically-informed, broadly accepting the mainstream 
scientific consensus, rather than attempting to commission much in the way of 
further scientific research, we conclude that differences in the science of the two 
issues does not explain the difference in approach of the reviews.  
 
3.2. Scale of the problem 
 
The scale of the problem, in particular how it is reflected in the respective policy 
frameworks, begins to give a better sense of the reasons for the difference in 
approach. Radioactive waste is intrinsically a national problem: countries have to 
manage a stock of radioactive waste produced by activities permitted and 
regulated by (if not actually carried out by) national governments. The UK, in 
common with many other countries, has committed to a policy of self-sufficiency 
in the management of Intermediate and High-Level radioactive waste, meaning 
that waste should be managed locally within the UK (41). Indeed, radioactive 
waste is not only national, it is local, in the sense that the waste is produced by a 
comparatively small set of processes (nuclear power, defence, medical and some 
industrial processes) in comparatively small volumes (relative to other material 
flows), and coupled with the fact that the sunk costs of storage/disposal 
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command a relatively high share of the total costs, a single community has to be 
found to “host” the waste. As a result, much of the politics of radioactive waste is 
driven by resistance, or the threat or prospect of resistance, from these host 
communities, and issues of equity, justice and procedural fairness loom large (42-
45).  
 
Conversely, climate change is a truly global, systemic, and transboundary 
hazard. The effects of greenhouse gases are global, since they are transmitted to 
the regional and local levels through global changes to the climate system. At the 
same time, all nations are responsible for greenhouse gas emissions, albeit in 
different proportions, and in most nations there are numerous sources of 
emissions. It is beyond the ability of any individual nation, even the biggest, to 
unilaterally reduce global emissions to low levels. There is also the disincentive 
to do so arising from the public-good nature of the hazard (i.e. other nations can 
free ride on these efforts). Thus climate change is an issue for international 
collective action, and national-level actions are highly contingent on the 
achievement of an acceptable international agreement. Furthermore, the cost 
structure of options to reduce emissions points to a wide portfolio of measures, 
due to the sheer magnitude of emissions reductions that many consider 
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necessary, which ultimately overwhelms the economies of scale associated with 
any one currently practicable measure (e.g. 46, 47). 
 
These differences in the scale of the issues, summarised in table II, lead us 
directly into the policy context and history. 
 
Table II about here 
 
3.3. Political context 
 
On political context, the issues can also be sharply distinguished (see table III). Of 
course there are again similarities. Both hazards are critically linked with – and 
linked by – energy policy. Roughly one quarter of global greenhouse gas 
emissions comes from the power sector; in the UK it is closer to one third (48). 
Moreover replacing fossil-fuel electricity generation capacity with nuclear power 
is considered by many, including the UK government, to be a promising option 
for reducing emissions. In the UK, there is some urgency surrounding energy-
supply policy, because a significant portion of the country’s current generation 
capacity will need to be replaced in the coming decade or two. In both cases, the 
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issue is contentious, with significant interest groups and pressure groups with 
strong views on either side of the issue. 
 
Table III about here 
 
However, there have been clear differences in the state of, and pressures on, UK 
policy towards radioactive waste, compared with climate change. Radioactive 
waste management has been on the policy agenda for several decades and the 
UK government, through its implementor the Nuclear Industry Radioactive 
Waste Executive (NIREX), has repeatedly tried and failed to develop solutions (1, 
49). The history of both radioactive waste management in particular and nuclear 
technology in general has left a legacy of suspicion and distrust of state- and 
industry-sponsored actors and established science, and their combined ability to 
deliver solutions in the UK and internationally (50-52). While the mainstream 
scientific community has tended to favour geological disposal solutions (or even 
more politically controversial sub-seabed solutions), this has not been a view 
shared by the public at large, or by environmental organisations (for example, 
the Royal Society (53), in its role as the UK national academy of science, noted “We 
conclude that deep geological disposal is the best available long-term option, but 
recognise the fact that this is not yet widely accepted.”). CoRWM was initiated 
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against this backdrop, after the NIREX-sponsored programme’s application to 
build an underground laboratory in Cumbria as a prelude to the construction of 
a repository had been rejected by the Secretary of State. At this point, the 
radioactive waste management process in the UK had stalled. 
 
With climate change, the position was different. Public concern in the UK about 
climate change was consistently high in the years running up to the 
commissioning of the Stern Review, as evidenced by a range of opinion polls. 
One poll conducted in 2004 found that 63% of respondents supported the 
proposition “assume the worst and take major action now to reduce human 
impacts on climate, even if there are major costs” (54). Exactly 63% of respondents 
in a 1999 poll had supported the same proposition (54). More importantly, instead 
of actively distrusting the role of the state, similar opinion polling showed that a 
clear majority (70%) of Britons called for the government to “take the lead in 
combating climate change, even it means using the law to change people’s 
behaviour” (55). Unlike radioactive waste then, this put UK public opinion in line 
with the consensus view from the scientific community, and with a political 
consensus shared by all three of the UK’s main parties (56). 
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Yet such a high degree of public support was not matched at the time by concrete 
policy measures domestically, nor was it always mirrored in other parts of the 
world. For example, the aforementioned survey was also administered to a 
sample from the United States, finding that in 2004 only 48% supported the 
proposition “assume the worst and take major action now to reduce human 
impacts on climate, even if there are major costs”, which was itself only slightly 
up from 46% in 1999 (54). Indeed, these two observations are related, because it 
was the lack of progress in the international negotiations on climate change, 
caused in turn by insufficiently strong domestic constituencies in favour of action 
to curb emissions in key countries like the United States, which rendered UK 
politicians reluctant to advance too far. 
 
3.4. Weighing up the explanations  
 
The framing of CoRWM’s task reflects the pervasive lack of public trust on the 
nuclear issue. CoRWM’s brief was explicitly “to arrive at recommendations 
which can inspire public confidence and are practicable in securing the long term 
safety of the UK's radioactive wastes”, with the sponsor further noting (to 
eliminate any residual ambiguity) that the Committee “must therefore listen to 
what people say during the course of its work, and address the concerns that 
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they raise” (1, Annex 1). This is in line with international good practice in radioactive 
waste management (45); also UK national commentators, including those with 
links to the earlier, failed, NIREX process, have come to the view that more 
transparent, responsive and participatory approaches are essential to meaningful 
progression (49). Yet in the light of the essentially national scale of the problem, 
there was no need to involve and convince an international audience. Although 
CoRWM was chaired by an economist, there is little direct evidence of an 
economic imprint on CoRWM’s report, albeit CoRWM did commission work on 
the costs of the various options. 
 
In the case of climate change, facing a domestic public which shared scientists’ 
concerns, but a sceptical international community which required convincing 
and motivating, the challenge was to garner international support. Jordan and 
Lorenzoni (56`, p310) argue persuasively that the Stern Review was part of a “much 
grander geo-strategic plan to convince the rest of the world that ‘business as 
usual’ will eventually lead to unacceptable risks”. Making the economic case for 
action was a pivotal part of this plan. Indeed, the Stern Review was 
commissioned against the backdrop of the so-called ‘Gleneagles Dialogue on 
Climate Change’, conducted under the auspices of the G8 together with the five 
leading emerging economies. In this context, we can understand the ministerial 
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home of the Stern Review in the UK’s central government (i.e. the Treasury, 
rather than DEFRA), its terms of reference to take a global view over the 
medium- to long-term, and ultimately its choice of CBA for the task. The 
international imperative to conduct an economic assessment of climate targets 
was buttressed by certain domestic political dynamics. A report by the House of 
Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs (57) had been quite critical of the lack 
of economic evidence used to form climate policy in the UK. Partly as a response 
to this and partly in expectation of the likely increasing fiscal importance of 
climate policy in the future (e.g. through revenues from carbon taxation), climate 
change rose up the list of priorities for the Treasury. Without the need to win 
over the domestic public, it is equally clear why much less emphasis was placed 
on public and stakeholder engagement.  
 
Overall this discussion suggests that the differences in approach taken by the 
two reviews are much more obviously explained by political context, and in turn 
by scale, than they are by the scientific nature of the problem: different political 
pressures and imperatives prevailed at the time CoRWM and Stern were 
commissioned; and the constituencies or ‘audiences’ were different. Thus 
CoRWM’s broad-based membership and emphasis on transparency in modelling 
were well suited to a policy problem characterised by a legacy of suspicion and 
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distrust. Stern’s technically rich CBA, on the other hand, was well suited to a 
policy problem characterised by a (perceived) lack of economic credibility behind 
ambitious climate targets. 
 
To develop this point in more detail, we now turn to the question of ‘how’, as 
opposed to ‘why’, the respective approaches of the two reviews were chosen. In 
both cases, it is evident that the approach was framed to a large extent by the 
terms of reference that were drawn up, and hence the choice was indeed made at 
an early, political stage. As we have mentioned, CoRWM’s terms of reference 
placed heavy emphasis on public and stakeholder engagement, and they also 
arguably anticipated that MCDA would be the analytic approach most suited to 
structure this engagement, since they required the identification of “criteria” for 
assessment (but not, for example, “scenarios”, which might have led to a greater 
focus on uncertainty). At the same time, Stern’s terms of reference, which were 
after all drawn up by the Treasury, called inter alia for an examination of the 
evidence on “the costs and benefits of actions to reduce the net global balance of 
greenhouse gas emissions” (2, p ix). Elsewhere in Stern’s terms of reference, the 
Review is charged with the task of “taking into account the risks of increased 
climate volatility and major irreversible impacts”. 
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From this point of departure, any further choices to be made appear to have 
flowed largely from the individuals appointed to carry out the reviews, and the 
methods with which they were familiar. This is perhaps most obviously true of 
Stern, one of the UK government’s most senior economists at the time, who 
brought with him decades of experience in welfare economics in general and 
CBA in particular. But it is also true of CoRWM. Key documents (both internal 
and from outside experts) from the early stages of developing CoRWM’s 
methodology show that prior experience with MCDA played a role in its choice, 
in particular in connection with the ‘Best Practicable Environmental Option’ 
procedures for radioactive waste disposal at UK nuclear sites, and the NIREX 
waste disposal site selection processes of the 1980s and 1990s (58, 59). This is despite 
the fact that the problem CoRWM faced was different, being larger in scale and 
much more challenging (in that it was asked not to recommend a site, but a way 
forward more generally). In this sense CoRWM’s approach can be thought of as 
creatively making use of an approach which already had a track record in the UK 
radioactive waste context. 
 
To turn around the question of how the review’s approaches came to be chosen, 
we can also ask what was ignored in the process of making this choice. Neither 
review made its choice of approach on the basis of a comprehensive survey of 
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methodological possibilities. While it is clear that Stern thought reflectively about 
the strengths and limitations of formal CBA (see e.g. chapters 2 and 6 of 2), there is no 
evidence to suggest that this thinking extended to considering whether methods 
could be borrowed from the tradition of MCDA. Turning to CoRWM, 
probabilistic methods are mentioned in a peer review of an early methods 
document by a prominent international decision and risk analyst (60), but this 
does not seem to have been taken up by CoRWM. Equally, formal economic 
methods are dismissed in a single line in a Review of Options Assessment 
Methodologies commissioned by CoRWM (59) (“Simply using economic models has 
been widely questioned: for example, ‘how can you value a feeling of well-being?’”, 
p 1). To summarise, neither review appears to have seriously engaged with the 
possibilities offered by methods from outside the relevant discipline and 
tradition. In the next section we will consider whether that was a mistake. 
 
4. SHOULD THE REVIEWS HAVE BEEN LESS DIFFERENT, AND WHAT 
COULD THEY HAVE LEARNED FROM EACH OTHER? 
 
We are left with a more normative question; could and should the two reviews 
have been less different? It is worth highlighting at the outset that both reviews 
were, on the whole, well received. CoRWM’s public and stakeholder engagement 
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is regarded as an outstanding achievement by, for instance, the Independent 
Evaluator (29), and its substantive conclusions have also been well received by, for 
instance, the Royal Society (61), and by the House of Lords Science and 
Technology Committee (62). The Stern Review’s conclusions were also well 
received in many quarters, with, for instance, an impressive range of 
endorsements published with the book version of the review report (2), and the 
Review has stimulated and focussed public and political attention both in the UK 
and internationally. We personally regard both reviews as substantial 
achievements and “fit for purpose”, although acknowledging that our respective 
roles mean that we may not have been entirely unbiased. 
 
Nevertheless, both reviews have generated ongoing controversy. Without 
seeking to canvass all views on the two reports (which would require a paper, or 
perhaps a book, by itself), we focus on two issues of particular interest for our 
current comparison. One is the role of uncertainty and the recommendation of an 
intensified R&D programme in the case of CoRWM. The other is the handling of 
benefits accruing to future generations in the case of Stern.  
 
Turning first to uncertainty in radioactive waste management, one reading of the 
case proponents make for geological disposal is that, while neither disposal nor 
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storage are risk-free, the probability of any given level of environmental 
degradation is lower under the disposal option than under the storage option. 
Equally, a key question in deciding the form of the waste management strategy is 
the scheduling of events, including the timing and conditions under which 
construction would begin on a repository, and the timing and conditions of the 
closing of the repository. Indeed, it has been argued that properly understanding 
the meaning of the concept of retrievability is pivotal in interpreting the feedback 
from the public and stakeholder engagement (63). It follows that the suitability of a 
particular analytic approach rides to a significant extent on its capacity to deal 
with these issues. 
 
In the MCDA, CoRWM’s approach was to try to formalise these aspects of the 
decision problem in criteria, such as “public safety” and “flexibility”. In the 
particular variant of MCDA it used (a multi-attribute value model), performance 
on one criterion was then traded off against performance on the other, and so on 
against performance on a wide range of other criteria. Elsewhere, the CoRWM 
report (chapter 18, p 147) makes an extensive qualitative survey of the 
uncertainties surrounding the options, noting that scientists have expressed 
confidence in geological disposal as a generic concept, but also that new 
uncertainties may arise in moving from a generic concept to a specific facility 
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design. It further discusses possible concerns about the bias of the same scientific 
community, due to institutional links to the nuclear industry. In the light of this 
uncertainty, CoRWM made a formal recommendation that there should be an 
“intensified programme of research and development into the long-term safety 
of geological disposal”. However, because the report relies heavily on qualitative 
statements of uncertainty, the degree of uncertainty is unclear, as is the extent of 
the expanded R&D programme. The government’s response to the 
recommendation on R&D is equivocal and falls short of committing new money 
to relevant R&D; effectively, the issue is thrown back to the technical 
establishment, in the shape of the regulators and to the Nuclear 
Decommissioning Agency (64). One of the CoRWM members has subsequently 
expressed his disappointment at this aspect of the government’s follow-through 
(63). 
 
Against this backdrop, we believe that a formal probabilistic modelling approach 
(65), of the sort undertaken by Stern or as exemplified in other approaches such as 
decision trees (66) and real options (67), would have had the advantage of making 
key uncertainties explicit and discussable, and could have helped clarify both the 
meaning of the nature of the solutions on the table, in particular with respect to 
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the conditions for undertaking particular actions (such as sealing the repository) 
and expectations about the scope of an expanded R&D programme. 
 
For its part, the Stern Review received some heavy criticism from those who took 
issue with a number of features of the Review’s CBA, especially its choice of an 
unusually low discount rate to compare the future benefits of emissions 
reductions with their present costs (18, 68-71). The discount rate captures a key 
ethical trade-off between burdens on the present generation and burdens on 
generations in the far-off future. It has long been known that the results of a CBA 
of climate targets are very sensitive to the discount rate (compare 22, 72). What many 
commentators found disappointing about the Stern Review was the lack of 
sensitivity analysis to demonstrate the contingency of the overall 
recommendations on the discount rate: in other words, the Review was seen to 
be trying to impose a particular view on intergenerational equity, and to be 
doing so without openness (73, 74). This was self-defeating, as in certain quarters it 
diminished the Review’s capability to persuade people into support for curbing 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
Hence, just as CoRWM could have benefitted from Stern’s explicitly probabilistic 
approach, we consider that Stern could have benefitted from CoRWM’s intensive 
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use of public and stakeholder engagement. As Stern notes repeatedly, at the core 
of climate-change policy is an ethical problem. It could be that the public at large 
feel a strong sense of obligation to future generations; however, Stern did not 
seek evidence that this was the case, nor did they seek to probe exactly what is 
the nature of that obligation. Such an engagement would have given Stern 
ammunition to deal with its critics. Moreover, in times of economic difficulty, a 
real danger is that national publics may lose the will to incur the very concrete 
costs of action. Some level of prior public engagement might well have 
strengthened public resolve to see through the necessary sacrifices – in 
Yankelovich’s (75) terms, to “come to public judgement”, and accept the necessary 
tradeoffs.  
 
Reflecting on the comparison, we argue that CoRWM could have benefitted from 
some formal uncertainty analysis, just as Stern could have benefitted from some 
extra public engagement – although of course all reviews operate within a fixed 
budget envelope and delivery date and any additional activity must be 
counterbalanced by cuts elsewhere. One possible objection, however, is that 
Stern’s analytic approach and its deliberative strategy were bound up together, 
as were CoRWM’s; and that attempts to be at the same time intensely technically 
analytic and extensively participative are bound to fail. The reasoning behind 
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this goes beyond the simple observation that both analysis and participation 
represent competing demands on resources. Rather, the thought is that the 
proliferation of technical detail makes meaningful lay participation impossible, 
and discussion fora become dominated by those with technical expertise. 
Obviously there may be an element of truth in this, but we see the challenge for 
future strategic reviews not as deciding where they want to position themselves 
on an analysis-deliberation frontier, but as pushing forward that frontier, 
developing new and better ways to combine analysis and deliberation, as both 
Stern and CoRWM, in their different ways, attempted to do. For example, 
CoRWM’s use of longitudinal engagement mechanisms (the citizen’s juries and 
roundtables which met multiple times following a roadmap leading to decision, 
with feedback between rounds of consultation) provided a way to help 
nonexperts build specialist knowledge and contribute more meaningfully. 
Stern’s modelling, to take another example, captured key value judgements 
within a small number of parameters governing the discount rate, thus 
potentially providing a way for concerned parties without a background in the 
underpinning theory to understand the implications of their moral intuitions 
about obligations to future generations.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
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In this paper, we have attempted a comparison of two quite different strategic 
policy reviews commissioned by the UK government on issues of environmental 
risk. We have expounded the differences in the ways in which the two reviews 
attempted to incorporate both analysis and deliberation in their working through 
of the respective issues. We have explored reasons for the differences, and 
argued that much of the difference can be explained by the political context in 
which the reviews took place, rather than the intrinsic nature of the risk decision 
itself. There is an argument that the subject matter and overall context of these 
reviews is so different that little can be learned from the comparison: that we are 
comparing apples and oranges. We would strongly contest this: as we have 
rehearsed throughout this paper, although there are dissimilarities, the 
similarities between the underlying risk decisions are pronounced, making the 
differences in the analytic and deliberative approaches taken, if anything, still 
more surprising and worthy of comment. 
 
The overarching motivation of this paper is the improvement of risk-related 
decision making, in particular the use of formal techniques such as CBA and 
MCDA. We find it disconcerting that policy reviews in the environmental 
domain should take such dissimilar forms. Ultimately these reviews are intended 
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to provide government with a reasoned basis for undertaking action. While we 
recognise that the study methodologies chosen, and the mode of presentation of 
results, will be influenced by political context, we would like to feel that there is 
a core of argumentation underpinning policy which is method-independent. 
Otherwise, the question naturally arises: were the conclusions reached 
determined by the methods used?  
 
This is not to say that different people may not take quite different views on the 
same policy issue. In dealing with complex environmental risks such as 
radioactive waste and climate change there are critical questions of time 
preference, risk attitude, attitude to distributional equity, responsibility to the 
non-human natural world, and confidence in the ability of the scientific 
establishment to deliver reliable predictions. Such questions are inherently 
judgemental. However, the role of methods such as CBA and MCDA should be 
to help decision makers structure and clarify these judgements; as their 
proponents repeatedly stress, they should not make the decision, and insofar as 
key value judgements are implicitly embedded in the methods, they fail. 
 
The general implication of this line of reasoning is that choice of study method in 
such reviews should be, as far as possible, reflective, informed by an awareness 
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of a range of methods and an understanding of their strengths and weaknesses. 
Others have suggested criteria which may be used to guide methods choice: for 
example, Fischoff, Lichtenstein, Slovic, Derby and Keeney (76) suggest approaches 
to supporting decisions should be: comprehensive; logically sound; practical; 
open to evaluation; politically acceptable; compatible with institutions; and 
conducive to learning; Dietz and Stern (77) consider that science has the best 
chance of being integrated with public participation if the methods used ensure 
that: decision-relevant information is accessible to all parties; explicit attention is 
given to both facts and values; analytic assumptions and uncertainties are 
explicitly described; and there is independent review and learning as new 
information comes to light. 
 
We also consider that that reviews should draw on multiple methods, deploying 
and combining them in creative ways in order to best meet the needs of the study 
in question. In the specific case of Stern and CoRWM, our conclusion is that the 
two reviews could have learned from each other: some of Stern’s analytic 
approaches, particularly around the explicit handling of uncertainty, could 
profitably have been used to strengthen CoRWM’s case; and some of CoRWM’s 
public and stakeholder engagement would have added robustness to Stern’s 
discussion of the ethics of climate change. Irrespective of whether the reader 
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accepts this view, what seems harder to dispute is that frameworks for the 
design of strategic appraisal of environmental risks are lacking. In settings such 
as routine appraisal, there are detailed technical guidelines about how problems 
are to be modelled (e.g. in the UK there is the so-called Green Book (76)), and one 
can expect that appraisers will follow the guidelines and justify when they 
depart from them. However, in the context of these “strategic appraisals” as we 
have called them, there seems to be no way of learning from previous practice in 
other domains, and little in the way of systematic guidance for taking methods 
decisions. We hope this paper will provide a spur and foundation for the 
development of such guidance. 
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Figure 1. Appraisal of policy problems involving decision under risk. Choices 
in appraisal, and factors influencing those choices. 
 
Table I. Differences between CoRWM and Stern. 
 CoRWM Stern 
Analytic approach Multi-Criteria Decision 
Analysis – scoring and 
weighting of options, 
structured around 
stakeholder participation 
Cost-Benefit Analysis – 
extensive technical modelling 
to enable Stern to make 
comparison of costs and 
benefits under uncertainty 
Deliberation 
strategy – internal 
composition and 
dynamics 
Independent committee; 
diverse membership 
including both insiders and 
outsiders 
Undertaken within a 
government department; led by 
senior civil servant from that 
department, supported by a 
team of more junior civil 
Problem scale 
Choice of analytic approach 
Choices of deliberative strategy 
Underpinning 
science 
Policy context 
and history 
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servants 
Deliberation 
strategy – public 
and stakeholder 
engagement 
Extensive arrangements for 
deliberation throughout 
process; focus on civil 
society 
Standard, ‘light-touch’ 
consultation (publish 
consultation document – invite 
responses); focus on national 
and international policy 
networks 
 
Table II. Differences in the scale of the radioactive waste and climate change 
problems. 
 Radioactive Waste Management Climate Change 
Scale and 
international-
isation 
Nation states manage own waste – 
host community required to 
shoulder the burden 
Transboundary in causes and 
consequences – impacts spread 
across many social groups 
Cost structure 
of solutions 
Small number of management 
strategies 
Many, diffuse solutions  
 
Table III. Differences in the policy context of CoRWM and the Stern Review. 
 Radioactive Waste Management Climate Change 
Public attitudes Nuclear industry has 
longstanding public-relations 
problems 
Goodwill towards action 
(though public resolve 
untested) 
Policy situation National policy process stalled 
by failure of ‘decide, announce, 
defend’ 
International community 
(G8(+5)) unconvinced of the 
economic case for action 
 
 
